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A B S T R A C T
We empirically study the asset side of market discipline in the banking system of the Kyrgyz
Republic, examining whether borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to high-
quality banks. Based on dynamic panel models and a dataset with bank information from
23 banks over the period 2010–2012, our ﬁndings suggest the presence of market disci-
pline induced by borrowers. In other words, banks with higher capital ratios and liquidity
charge higher interest rates on loans. This result has several implications for the banking
policy in Kyrgyzstan, where we can recommend to policymakers a disclosure policy fol-
lowing the Third Pillar of Basel III, because not only can the bank’s creditors use bank
information to penalize the excessive bank risk, but borrowers can also use this informa-
tion to discipline their banks.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Motivation
Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest post-Soviet countries,
but its commercial banks have been developing rapidly in
the last decade, increasing banking competition, yet with
several problems of stability (National Bank of the Kyrgyz
Republic, 2013a). In 2010, jointly with the global ﬁnancial
crisis, several bank failures provoked signiﬁcant losses for
the Kyrgyz economy. Evidently, the transition to a market
economy is a complicated task.
In early April 2010, anti-government political demon-
strations occurred in various cities of the Kyrgyz Republic.
These protests turned into riots, resulting in loss of life and
material damage (Asian Development Bank et al., 2010). The
global economic crisis as well as the domestic political crisis
signiﬁcantly reduced the banking solvency. The uncertain-
ty and insecurity associated with these crises led people to
increase their cash holdings, negatively impacting banking
deposits, and credit to the private sector (National Bank of
the Kyrgyz Republic, 2011, 2013a, 2013b).
The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR)1 made
attempts to rescue the banking sector, but the failure of one
of the largest banks, Asia Universal Bank (AUB), was inevi-
table, causing a domino effect. Actually, AUB was audited
becauseof suspicious transactions,principally, offenses related
tomoney laundering and corruption. As a result, other three
banks (Investbank Issyk-Kul,Manas Bank, and Kyrgyz Credit
Bank) were put under temporary closing-down.
In this context, the Soviet past and little experience in
the market economy give Kyrgyz banks a particular rele-
vance to study the transition to international standards of
Corresponding author: National Research University Higher School of
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1 This is the oﬃcial name of the Central Bank. Under perestroika, the
monobank system was replaced with a two-tier banking system. In Feb-
ruary 1992, the state bank (Gosbank USSR) was renamed the National Bank
of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR), with responsibilities for safeguarding the
payments system, providing liquidity, licensing and supervising second-
tier banks (Brown et al., 2009; Ruziev & Majidov, 2013).
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accounting, reporting, and regulation (Ruziev & Majidov,
2013), where, since 1988, the Basel Committee has played
the most important role in banking policy. In 2004,
Basel II introduced three basic pillars: (1) Minimum capital
requirements, (2) Supervisory review process, and (3)
Market discipline (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2006).
The objective of market discipline is to complement the
ﬁrst and second pillars of banking regulation and supervi-
sion. Moreover, the new approach in Basel III situates the
relevance of market discipline on the same level as gov-
ernmental supervision, and its main function is to facilitate
market punishment for excessive risk. Consequently, the
Basel Committee proposes disclosure and transparency poli-
cies to equipmarket participants with all needed information
for decision-making, and to combat suspicious ﬁnancial
transactions, money laundering, and the ﬁnancing of
terrorism.
In economic terms, market discipline weakens asym-
metric information and moral hazard concerns. It can be
understood as the behavior of market participants, and can
be easily analyzed using the supply and demandmodel. For
instance, in the deposit market, depositors will respond to
riskier behavior of their banks demanding higher interest
rates on deposits (price mechanism of market discipline)
or/and withdrawing their deposits (quantity mechanism of
market discipline). As a result, the banks should moderate
their risk-taking (Tovar-García, 2014). Other bank credi-
tors should analogously react to bank risk, mainly
subordinated debt holders, because they are the last in line
to recover their ﬁnancial assets in case of bankruptcy
(Evanoff, Jagtiani, & Nakata, 2011; Tovar-García, 2015b). The
interbank market has been grown considerably during the
last three decades, and there is also evidence for peer moni-
toring, where lending banksmonitor and charge higher rates
to low-quality banks (Distinguin, Kouassi, & Tarazi, 2013;
Tovar-García, 2015a).
The market discipline effect induced by depositors, sub-
ordinated debt holders, and other banks has already been
widely examined. This hypothesis has been tested in China
(Wu & Bowe, 2012), in ex-socialist countries including
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski,
& Kozłowski, 2013), several times in Russia (Karas, Pyle, &
Schoors, 2010, 2013; Peresetsky, 2008; Semenova, 2007;
Tovar-García, 2013; Ungan, Caner, & Özyıldırım, 2008), but
it has not been tested in ex-Soviet Asian countries.
Conversely, there is comparatively little attention paid
to the asset side of market discipline. There are theoreti-
cal and empirical ﬁndings suggesting that borrowers also
punish their banks because of excessive risk-taking. In a the-
oretical model, Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011, p. 984)
state that “when credit markets are competitive, market dis-
cipline coming from the asset side induces banks to hold
positive levels of capital as a way to commit to monitor and
attract borrowers”. Thus, banks have incentives to achieve
high levels of capital, and in many cases bank capital ratios
are higher than the minimal requirement suggested by the
Basel Accord.
In the case of Norway, Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale (2005,
p. 682) point out that “banks face market discipline induced
by borrowers”, because they are willing to pay higher rates
on loans from high-quality banks for two major reasons:
First, they have a certiﬁcation motive, where borrowers
prefer banks with high-quality loan portfolios to signal their
creditworthiness to other stakeholders. Second, borrow-
ers have a reﬁnancing motive, where they choose solvent
banks because these banks are able to extend credit lines
or new loans in the future. Similarly, in the Mexican case,
Tovar-García (2012) found evidence in favor of the certiﬁ-
cation and reﬁnancing motives, but the largest Mexican
banks can avoid this kind of market discipline. In Russia,
the interest rates on loans discriminates between high- and
low-quality banks, where high-quality banks charge higher
interest rates in accordance with the market discipline hy-
pothesis from the asset side (Tovar-García, 2013).
Thus, the Basel Committee proposes market discipline
as a key instrument to strengthen the stability and effec-
tiveness of the banking sector. However, in several
developing countries the evidence in favor of the market
discipline hypothesis is weak, and the stability of the banking
system is often the responsibility of monetary authorities,
with problems of corruption, lack of experience, and lack
of technology (Calomiris, 1999; Tovar-García, 2014). In the
case of ex-Soviet countries, arguably, market discipline
should not fundamentally work because of deﬁcient markets
(Matovnikov, 2012). Consequently, the Kyrgyz Republic is
timidly following the recommendations of Basel III, includ-
ing the disclosure policy to support market discipline (Barth,
Caprio, & Levine, 2013).
Given this, the objective of this research is to test the ex-
istence of market discipline from the asset side in the Kyrgyz
banking system and to analyze its implications for banking
policy. Accordingly, this research is focused on the follow-
ing question: In Kyrgyzstan, do borrowers pay higher interest
rates to high-quality banks? Based on previous studies, we
hypothesize that Kyrgyz borrowers pay higher interest rates
on loans to high-quality banks (low-risk banks) because they
prefer solvent banks with high capital ratios and low loan
losses; that is, borrowers have a reﬁnancing motive (to
ensure future credit lines and new loans) and a certiﬁca-
tion motive (to signal their creditworthiness to other
stakeholders).
We test these hypotheses using a sample of 23 com-
mercial banks of the Kyrgyz Republic and quarterly data from
January 2010 to December 2012. Based on dynamic panel
models, our ﬁndings suggest the presence of market dis-
cipline induced by borrowers. This has several implications
for banking policy in Kyrgyzstan, where we can recom-
mend a disclosure policy following the Third Pillar of Basel
III. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the Kyrgyz banking system, and the data used in this
study. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and pres-
ents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Kyrgyz banking system
In the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s, several
reforms supported the establishment of a two-tier banking
sector, foreign bank entry, ﬁnancial liberalization, and priva-
tization, intended to increase the size, stability, and eﬃciency
of the Kyrgyz banking sector. The result was a reduction in
interest rates on loans and deposits (to support economic
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growth),2 although there were no reductions in interme-
diation spreads (Brown, Maurer, Pak, & Tynaev, 2009).
Several Kyrgyz state and private banks failed before and
after the Russian crisis in 1998. The number of banks has
varied from 19 to 23 during the period 1997–2008, with
three foreign-owned banks in 1997, and 10 in 2008 (Kazakh
banks acquired several Kyrgyz banks). The asset share of
state-owned banks has diminished, with the maximum
share of 25.8% in 1999, and the minimum of 3.4% in 2006
(Ruziev & Majidov, 2013).
In comparison to other countries of the region, the effects
of the global ﬁnancial crisis on Kyrgyzstan were stronger
(Ruziev & Majidov, 2013). In addition, in 2010 the widest
political events in the modern history of the country oc-
curred (the Peacock Revolution),3 which were accompanied
bymass protests against the authoritarian regime (Murzaeva
& Akçalı, 2013; Zabortseva, 2012). As a result, the presi-
dent and government were removed, and many bankers
suffered because they were related to the regime.
In 2010, the main ﬁnancial indicators of the largest bank,
Asia Universal Bank (AUB), announced its failure. This caused
negative impacts on other banks, borrowers, depositors, and
other debt holders. In general, all Kyrgyz banks suffered enor-
mous losses and lack of liquidity, seriously affecting
investments and trade (Asian Development Bank et al.,
2010).
Thus, the main impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis and
the domestic political events in 2010 in the banking sector
was the bankruptcy of AUB, on October 27. The monetary
authorities unsuccessfully explored options for a bank
bailout, but the results show that there are banks too-big-
to-save (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2013).
Fortunately, for small depositors, since August 2008 the
Kyrgyz Republic has a deposit insurance system, provided
by the Deposit Insurance Agency in cooperation with the
Kyrgyz banks. Within 15 calendar days, the Deposit Insur-
ance Agency reviews the bank default, and the payment of
compensation should begin no later than a period of 60 cal-
endar days after the bank’s default (each depositor’s
compensation pays no more than 100,000 soms).4 In Kyr-
gyzstan, the participation in the deposit insurance system
is mandatory for all commercial banks operating in the
country (Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008).
Later on, as shown in Figure 1, the banking sector re-
covered the path of growth. In the fourth quarter of 2012,
the total assets of the banking system amounted to 81.8
billion of soms, an increase of 22.7% on the same period of
the previous year. The main share of the banks’ assets refers
to loans and interbank accounts, 45.2%.
This growth of the industry was accompanied by bank
concentration. In 2010, four of the largest banks accounted
for 39.1% of the total assets in the banking sector, and they
accounted for 55.7% in December 2012. In this year, con-
sidering the structure of the resource base, these four banks
held 37.1% of the capital in the banking sector.
In the fourth quarter of 2012, the total loan portfolio of
the banking system was 37.02 billion soms, which in-
creased from the beginning of the third quarter of 2012 by
2.69%, presenting a positive trend during the period 2010–
2012. The relative increase of the share of loans in total assets
is stable, and there are no sharp ﬂuctuations.
This growth of loans should not happen at the expense
of reducing the requirements for borrowers, which could
lead to an imbalance of the market, and increase the risks
of non-repayment of loans. Because excessive credit growth
in the economy is systemically important, this rapid credit
growth should be accompanied by quality in the credit port-
folio. In the Kyrgyz case, it seems that this loan growth is
a response to lower interest rates on loans, which present
a negative trend during the period 2010–2012. Theweighted
average interest rate on loans5 decreased from 2010, al-
though in December 2012 the average interest rate was
2 In the 1990s the average real GDP growth rate was −3.4% (with a
minimal value in 1994, −20.1%), and in the 2000s the average was 4.3%
(with a maximum in 2007, 8.5%). In 2010, 2011, and 2012 the rates were
−0.5%, 5.9%, and −0.9%, respectively (data from World Development Indi-
cators, World Bank). Kyrgyzstan surpassed its pre-transition GDP level in
2008 (Ruziev & Majidov, 2013).
3 In March 2005, other political turmoil (the Tulip Revolution) affected
the Kyrgyz economy. In that year, the real GDP growth rate was −0.2%, with
a fast recovery of the economy in the following years.
4 Som is the national currency of the Kyrgyz Republic, introduced on
10 May 1993. On 1 March 2014 the exchange rate to US dollar was 53.9.
5 The weight interest rate is used in determining the total cost of credits,
and takes into account not only the quantity of credit accounts, but also
their volumes. It is calculated as the sum of multiplying the interest rate
for each credit on the credit amount, and then dividing by the total amount
of all credits.
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Fig. 1. Kyrgyz banking system. Major indicators 2010–2012 (%, million soms). Source: National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR).
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22.9%, an increase of 1.12 percentage points on the previ-
ous quarter.
2.1. Data and summary statistics
In 2010, there were 22 commercial banks operating in
the Kyrgyz Republic, for the current situation there are 23
commercial banks. Among them 4 banks are considered
large, 11 banks are small, and the other 8 are medium-
sized, according to the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic
(NBKR).
To test the asset side of market discipline, the database
of this research includes ﬁnancial balance sheets and reports
on proﬁts and losses from Kyrgyz commercial banks cov-
ering the period from January 2010 to December 2012 on
quarterly basis. Because of data limitations, we cannot
compare the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. Our
sample includes data from 23 commercial banks (see
Table 1), but due to data limitations a maximum of 22 banks
are included in the regression analysis (the observations of
AUB are excluded). Our dataset is built using two main
sources: banks’ web sites and reports and web-site of the
NBKR.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics on bank vari-
ables, where it is possible to see differences and variability
of the main variables, intra bank and between banks. The
above-mentioned weighted average interest rate on loans
becomes the dependent variable of the regression analy-
sis in the next section. There are a few banks presenting a
high variability (standard deviation) on interest rates
(EcoIslamicBank, Kazkommertsbank Kyrgyzstan, and Na-
tional Bank of Pakistan Bishkek branch) and other few banks
with a low variability (Dos-Credobank, Halyk Bank Kyrgyz-
stan, Tolubay, and Zalkar). Thus, from these tables, it is easy
to note that there are relevant differences in interest rates
across banks during the period of analysis.
The independent variables are: the ratio capital to total
assets (CAPITALR), speciﬁc reserves for loan losses divided
by nonperforming loans (RESERVE), doubtful loans divided
by total loans (DOUBTFUL), the logarithm of total assets
(SIZE), net income divided by total assets (ROA), net income
divided by capital (ROE), and high liquid assets divided by
the short-term liabilities (LIQUIDITY).6 These kinds of in-
dicators are known as bank fundamentals, and they are
widely used to approach bank risk.
As shown in Table 1, there are relevant differences in bank
fundamentals across banks. For instance, the capital ratio
is very low for Zalkar bank (0.02); moreover, this bank also
presents serious concerns in indicators about proﬁtability,
with losses during the period of analysis (ROA equals −0.001
and ROE equals −0.77), suggesting that this is a low quality
bank. However, Zalkar is a medium-sized bank and has high
reserves for loan losses (0.54), and a good level of liquidi-
ty (1.25), making this bank attractive for some market
participants. Other interesting example, with different char-
acteristics, is Kyrgyz Credit Bank, which presents the highest
capital ratio (0.76) and high liquidity (6.13), but with a large
variability (standard deviation equals 4.37). However, this
is a small bank, with very low levels of proﬁtability (ROA
equals 0.004 and ROE equals 0.001).
As shown in Table 2, the overall mean of CAPITALR equals
0.29, the minimum is −0.46, and the maximum is 0.99. The
negative value is presented by AUB, which failed at the end
of the third quarter of the year 2010. Note that during April
and June 2010 the political and economic crises led to sig-
niﬁcant reductions of total assets and capital, and this bank
was recognized to be insolvent in accordance with the court
decisions.7
The overall mean of RESERVE is 0.44 points, the
minimum is 0.001 and the maximum is 0.96. This ratio
shows the extent of the risk in credit operations. High ratios
reﬂect an adequate level of reserves for possible loan losses,
and better protection of the bank from damages. Higher
values of RESERVE indicate lower bank risk.
Themean of DOUBTFUL is 0.05, and themaximum is 0.61.
Higher levels of DOUBTFUL indicate higher credit risks. In
other words, it indicates a higher probability of ﬁnancial
losses due to default on its obligations under the loan. The
highest value (0.61) belongs to Manas Bank, in the second
quarter of the year 2011. This value is a result of a crimi-
nal case (Sytenkova, 2013).
The minimal value of return on assets (ROA) is −0.97, and
the maximum is 0.06. The negative value corresponds to
the third quarter of the year 2010, presented by AUB. The
minimal value of return on capital (ROE) is −7.61, and the
maximum is 2.50. These indicators show proﬁtability on one
unit of assets and capital, respectively. If the level of the ratio
is high, the ﬁnancial position of the bank is better.
The average value of LIQUIDITY is 3.25, theminimal value
is 0.29, and the maximum is 148.22. The minimal value
belongs to AUB, in the third quarter of the year 2010. This
ratio shows the ability to fulﬁll all obligations to clients in
time. Higher ratios indicate higher levels of solvency.
Table 3 presents a correlationmatrix with themajor vari-
ables used in this research. We can see strong correlations
between several pairs: loans and deposits (0.72), total assets
and loans (0.85), total assets and deposits (0.94), loans and
capital (0.73), total assets and capital (0.73), and between
deposits and capital (0.57).
The high correlation between loans and deposits is ex-
plained by the fact that high volumes of deposits provide
the ﬁnancial resource base for the bank lending. The high
correlation between loans and total assets reﬂects the
obvious participation of loans in the total assets. The cor-
relation between total assets and deposits appears because
the bank is attracting deposits, to increase the volume of
active operations, such as lending and operations with se-
curities. The correlation between loans and capital is
explained by the fact that general provisions are created for
nonperforming loans, which are included in the total reg-
ulatory capital. Operational functions of the bank capital
provide an adequate basis for the growth of bank assets;
this explains the high correlation between total assets and
6 High liquid assets are cash, interbank deposits and credits, and secu-
rities of Central banks and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, and
short-term liabilities are the liabilities with the payment within 30 days.
7 The observations with negative values were not included in the re-
gression analysis, to avoid outliers.
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Table 1
Kyrgyz banks and major banking indicators.
Bank Interest rate
on loans (%)
Loansa Depositsa Loan
growthb
Capitala Total
assetsa
CAPITALRb RESERVEb DOUBTFULb ROAb ROEb LIQUIDITYb
Aiyl Bank 19.1 (1.88) 3001238 (343497) 484177 (387018) 1.02 (0.05) 1174400 (67726) 3637833 (692232) 0.33 (0.05) 0.56 (0.12) 0.002 (0.001) 0.02 (0.009) 0.06 (0.03) 1.18 (0.29)
Akyl 24.2 (0.43) 28213 (26083) 4888 (5716) 0.67 (0.26) 94316 (38407) 103721 (37021) 0.90 (0.07) 0.008 (.01) n.a. −0.08 (0.09) −0.10 (0.11) 45.8 (54.4)
Amanbank 27.2 (0.76) 1089841 (262345) 1089747 (241629) 1.06 (0.06) 388027 (53512) 2066496 (446212) 0.19 (0.02) 0.35 (0.10) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.06) 0.90 (0.23)
Asia Universal
Bank (AUB)*
23.1 (0.37) 3435015 (334611) 8849537 (8251432) 0.91 (0.00) -380792 (2609656) 1.22e+07 (1.22e+07) −0.21 (0.28) 0.32 (0.13) 0.09 (0.07) −0.56 (0.50) 1.54 (1.33) 0.51 (0.31)
Bakai Bank 21.4 (1.28) 495827 (109459) 943334 (172466) 1.05 (0.13) 305810 (35547) 1402576 (211278) 0.22 (0.03) 0.26 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.09 (0.08) 1.04 (0.15)
Bank Asia 22.8 (2.62) 383536 (113108) 385251 (127023) 1.08 (0.07) 228731 (37257) 793060 (248839) 0.30 (0.06) 0.19 (.08) 0.006 (0.003) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.05) 1.21 (0.18)
BTA Bank 24.5 (1.06) 1846737 (118584) 314156 (123561) 1.01 (0.03) 1150118 (82867) 3351704 (282682) 0.34 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.07 (0.006) 0.01 (0.008) 0.04 (0.02) 1.89 (0.69)
Commercial
Bank
Kyrgyzstan
25.6 (2.62) 2237901 (478009) 2629290 (676925) 1.06 (0.07) 562691 (77936) 4180635 (864303) 0.14 (0.02) 0.52 (0.09) 0.02 (0.005) 0.02 (0.01) 0.14 (0.08) 0.57 (0.07)
DKIB 22.8 (0.91) 1624869 (728902) 4881216 (1462732) 1.13 (0.06) 731799 (154994) 6626350 (1865523) 0.11 (0.02) 0.53 (0.17) 0.006 (0.004) 0.01 (0.009) 0.13 (0.09) 0.53 (0.07)
Dos-Credobank 25.4 (0.36) 395579 (181776) 640795 (213172) 1.10 (0.15) 296314 (19824) 1062364 (302639) 0.29 (0.07) 0.18 (0.12) 0.03 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.06) 0.92 (0.09)
EcoIslamicBank 29.2 (7.1) 848148 (215627) 1590813 (511774) 1.06 (0.10) 386403 (24087) 2332360 (646132) 0.18 (0.05) 0.34 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02) 0.003 (0.01) 0.02 (0.06) 0.92 (0.16)
FCB KAB 28.9 (3.13) 605437 (155653) 784627 (211497) 1.02 (0.18) 270678 (18731) 1298670 (250463) 0.21 (0.03) 0.26 (0.05) 0.01 (0.007) −0.006 (0.02) −0.03 (0.10) 0.67 (0.11)
Halyk Bank
Kyrgyzstan
21.1 (0.30) 1293644 (198567) 945745 (47767) 0.97 (0.06) 875632 (21706) 2367859 (288420) 0.37 (0.05) 0.35 (0.04) 0.11 (0.02) 0.02 (0.007) 0.04 (0.02) 1.01 (0.20)
Investbank Issyk-
Kul
23.6 (1.02) 207951 (73093) 81367 (111717) 0.93 (0.08) 161181 (85853) 400869 (326748) 0.47 (0.16) 0.73 (0.25) 0.11 (0.05) −0.08 (0.18) −0.22 (0.52) 1.51 (1.45)
Kazkommertsbank
Kyrgyzstan
8.8 (5.1) 312581 (184381) 514423 (59503) 0.95 (0.23) 634608 (11261) 1663131 (244410) 0.38 (0.05) 0.86 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.009) 0.04 (0.02) 1.05 (0.15)
KICB 23.0 (2.71) 3848416 (1140936) 3903604 (1492569) 1.07 (0.07) 1600192 (403205) 7410994 (2351631) 0.22 (0.02) 0.29 (0.05) 0.01 (0.005) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08 (0.06) 0.90 (0.07)
Kyrgyz Credit
Bank
20.6 (0.88) 280724 (110747) 87000 (94401) 0.90 (0.03) 409820 (18360) 590605 (240580) 0.76 (0.19) 0.63 (0.08) 0.06 (0.05) 0.004 (0.03) 0.001 (0.05) 6.13 (4.37)
Manas Bank 19.8 (0.88) 369072 (151844) 511380 (231754) 0.91 (0.09) 178804 (104915) 883114 (554439) 0.20 (0.04) 0.47 (0.08) 0.42 (0.21) −0.04 (0.04) −0.17 (0.19) 0.55 (0.22)
SSC Bank 19.4 (3.7) 2644570 (897730) 3781098 (1491476) 1.13 (0.14) 1207503 (279581) 8724762 (2666159) 0.15 (0.05) 0.55 (0.10) 0.005 (0.004) 0.01 (0.008) 0.06 (0.05) 0.80 (0.17)
Tolubay 27.4 (0.35) 586212 (107272) 609811 (145816) 1.05 (0.06) 195062 (34533) 957388 (158249) 0.20 (0.01) 0.64 (0.19) 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.01 (0.009) 0.07 (0.04) 1.31 (0.27)
UnicreditBank 23.6 (0.54) 5800953 (933750) 5398122 (1638254) 1.04 (0.04) 1467477 (239037) 9745000 (2316684) 0.15 (0.03) 0.47 (0.08) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.21 (0.11) 0.63 (0.10)
National Bank of
Pakistan
Bishkek branch
14.7 (7.6) 196388 (19096) 850154 (320663) 1.01 (0.08) 359678 (55767) 1311075 (360477) 0.28 (0.05) 0.46 (0.14) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.06 (0.03) 0.85 (0.06)
Zalkar 22.6 (0.31) 1513664 (282390) 710860 (80274) 0.97 (0.15) 54815 (57270) 3388829 (203893) 0.02 (0.02) 0.54 (0.14) 0.08 (0.02) −0.001 (0.006) −0.77 (2.60) 1.25 (0.43)
Mean of the variable over the period 2010q1–2012q4. * For AUB, mean from 2010q1 to 2010q3.
The standard deviations are in parentheses.
aMillion soms.
bRatio, n.a. = not available.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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capital. Finally, the high correlation between deposits and
capital is explained by the protection function of the capital,
as a buffer. In the case of bankruptcy, it becomes a source
of payments to creditors and depositors; that is, the banks
increase the capital in proportion to attracted deposits
(Lavrushin, 2009).
It is interesting to note that there are no high correla-
tions among bank fundamentals. Consequently, we can
exclude multicollinearity concerns in the regression anal-
ysis, but theoretically we can expect correlation between
RESERVE and DOUBTFUL because both variables approach
asset quality, and between ROA and ROE, both indicate bank
proﬁtability. Therefore, in the regression analysis we include
one or the other, to ensure the absence of multicollinear-
ity, and to check robustness to different indicators.
3. Empirical strategy
In the empirical literature is possible to identify differ-
ent econometric methods to test the market discipline
hypothesis. It is important to recognize that the variables
under study present endogeneity concerns (reverse cau-
sality), affecting the estimations of least squares, if we are
not using instrumental variables. Accordingly, Tovar-García
(2012) proposes dynamic panel models using the
generalized method of moments (GMM), based on Blundell
and Bond (1998), known as the SYS GMM estimator.
In comparison with least squares, the GMM estimator,
developed by Lars Peter Hansen, is more ﬂexible, because
it requires more simple assumptions about moment con-
ditions; consequently, this method became popular in the
empirical literature (Chaussé, 2005).
In presence of endogeneity, and autoregressive quali-
ties of the dependent variables, as our case, Arellano and
Bond (1991) developed amethod to be employedwith panel
data, known as the DIF GMM estimator. It transforms the
variables in ﬁrst-differences, uses lags of the independent
variables as instruments, and allows lags of the depen-
dent variable to be entered as regressors, assuming the
absence of serial correlation in the errors.
Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that the ﬁrst-differenced
standard GMM estimator may cause biases in ﬁnite-sample,
which provide weak instruments. Consequently, they use
an extension of the DIF GMMmodel, employing lagged dif-
ferences and lagged levels, to be used as instrumental
variables in the equation in ﬁrst-differences. The validity of
the instruments can be tested using the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, and in absence of serial correlation
(particularly of second order), the estimator ensures con-
sistency and eﬃciency.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Interest rate on loans (%) 252 22.91 4.90 1.64 40.00
Loansa 264 1367.81 1482.72 0.30 6873.97
Depositsa 264 1508.02 2015.36 0.21 18400.00
Loan growthb 241 1.01 0.15 0.26 1.42
Capitala 264 573.87 530.83 −2168.94 2613.81
Total assetsa 264 3023.01 3249.53 75.863 26300.00
CAPITALRb 263 0.29 0.22 −0.46 0.99
RESERVEb 249 0.44 0.22 0.001 0.96
DOUBTFULb 264 0.05 0.10 0.00005 0.61
ROAb 264 −0.003 0.09 −0.97 0.06
ROEb 264 0.03 0.54 −7.61 2.50
LIQUIDITYb 264 3.25 14.58 0.29 148.22
a
Million soms.
bRatio.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Interest rate on loans (1) 1
Loans (2) −0.03 1
Deposits (3) 0.004 0.72 1
Loan growth (4) 0.14 0.23 0.29 1
Capital (5) −0.20 0.73 0.57 0.22 1
Total assets (6) −0.09 0.85 0.94 0.29 0.73 1
CAPITALR (7) −0.15 −0.40 −0.44 −0.49 −0.08 −0.44 1
RESERVE (8) −0.38 −0.06 −0.04 −0.16 −0.01 −0.01 0.16 1
DOUBTFUL (9) −0. 12 −0.16 −0.16 −0.18 −0.21 −0.18 −0.05 0.06 1
ROA (10) −0.02 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.47 0.08 0.08 0.06 −0.17 1
ROE (11) 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.09 −0.01 0.11 −0.09 −0.05 −0.08 −0.14 1
LIQUIDITY (12) 0.04 −0.15 −0.13 −0.49 −0.13 −0.14 0.49 0.06 −0.07 −0.02 −0.02 1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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3.1. Test of market discipline from the asset side
To investigate whether borrowers pay higher interest
rates to high-quality banks, we estimate the parameters of
the baseline equation (1), using the SYS GMM estimator.
LnRATE LnRATE LnCAPITALR
LnAssetQuality
it it it
it
= +
+
− −
−
α β
β
1 1 1 1
2 1 3 1
4 1 5 1
+
+ + + +
−
− −
β
β β τ
SIZE
Profitability LnLIQUIDITY T u
it
it it t ′ it
(1)
where, RATE is the weighted average interest rate on loans.
LnAssetQuality includes the logarithm of RESERVE or the log-
arithm of DOUBTFUL, and Proﬁtability includes ROA or ROE
(in that way, we obtain four different speciﬁcations).
CAPITALR, RESERVE, DOUBTFUL, SIZE, ROA, ROE and LI-
QUIDITY have been deﬁned in the former section. T is a time
dummy variable for years, controlling effects of unspeci-
ﬁedmacroeconomic and ﬁnancial market conditions, which
are assumed constant across banks.8 Note that the inde-
pendent variables in the econometric model and the panel
data provide ﬁxed effects controlling for monotonous vari-
ables. In other words, the empirical strategy deals with
differences across banks which are time-invariant, or vari-
ables that are slowly changing, as we can expect is the case
of competition, currency structure of loans, and riskiness
of customers.
We test the effect of bank fundamentals on interest rates
on loans, as previous empirical tests suggest (Kim et al.,
2005; Tovar-García, 2012). We use a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the dependent and explanatory variables
(excluding ROA and ROE, because they have some
negative values). Consequently, the coeﬃcients indicate elas-
ticity (and the model achieves linearity). Additionally, we
enter the explanatory variables with one lag to account for
the delay in the information used by borrowers to make de-
cisions. We assume that potential borrowers, principally
those well ﬁnancially educated, will recognize changes in
bank fundamentals, from one quarter to another. In addi-
tion, we assume a substantial volume of new lending each
quarter, which is consistent with the increase of total loans
over the years of analysis (see Figure 1).
The statistical hypothesis is that RATE depends posi-
tively upon the level of CAPITALR, RESERVE, SIZE, ROA, and
LIQUIDITY, and depends negatively upon the level of DOUBT-
FUL, which is interpreted as evidence in favor of the market
discipline hypothesis from the asset side. In particular, we
expect a positive relationship between CAPITALR and RATE
(in favor of the reﬁnancing motive), and we expect a pos-
itive relationship between RESERVE and RATE, and a negative
relationship between DOUBTFUL and RATE (in favor of the
certiﬁcation motive). The variables SIZE, ROA, ROE, and LI-
QUIDITY are principally working as control variables, but
we also expect a signiﬁcant effect on the interest rate, sug-
gesting that borrowers alsomay take into account other bank
fundamentals.
Table 4, columns (1–4), presents regression results. The
dynamicmodel is well justiﬁed, because the dependent vari-
able as regressor enters signiﬁcantly. All regressions pass
the Sargan test (validating the employed instrumental vari-
ables) and the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation of
ﬁrst and second order.
In the four speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of CAPITALR
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. That
is, capital ratios are positively linked to interest rates on
loans, as the reﬁnancing motive predicts, and in favor of the
asset side market discipline effect.
8 It is not possible to include dummy variables for quarters, because of
multicollinearity concerns.
Table 4
Regression results.
Dependent variable:
Weighted average interest rate
on loans (RATE)
PredSign SYS GMM DIF GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged dependent as regressor 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17***
CAPITALR + 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.04*** −0.01 0.03*** 0.01
RESERVE + 0.004 0.01 0.01*** 0.01***
DOUBTFUL − 0.001 −0.0003 −0.02*** −0.02***
SIZE + 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.002 −0.03*** −0.01 −0.04***
ROA + 0.25 −0.13 0.17** 0.16***
ROE + 0.03 0.02 0.05*** 0.03***
LIQUIDITY + 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.003 0.01* 0.003 0.01*
Year 2011 (dummy) −0.01* −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.05*** −0.05*** −0.05*** −0.05***
Year 2012 (dummy) −0.01 −0.01** −0.01 −0.01** −0.06*** −0.05*** −0.06*** −0.05***
Period 2010Q1−2012Q4
Observations 218 215 218 215 193 192 193 192
N × T 22 × 11 21 × 11 22 × 11 21 × 11 21 × 10 20 × 10 21 × 10 20 × 10
Sargan test
(p-value)
7.47
(1.00)
8.64
(0.99)
6.63
(1.00)
9.79
(0.99)
19.33
(0.37)
17.08
(0.51)
19.11
(0.38)
16.08
(0.57)
First order serial
correlation test
(p-value)
−1.03
(0.30)
−1.23
(0.22)
−1.09
(0.27)
−1.15
(0.25)
−0.91
(0.36)
−0.90
(0.37)
−0.92
(0.36)
−0.92
(0.36)
Second order serial
correlation test
(p-value)
1.07
(0.28)
1.09
(0.27)
1.08
(0.27)
1.09
(0.27)
1.31
(0.19)
1.36
(0.17)
1.32
(0.18)
1.38
(0.17)
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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The coeﬃcients of RESERVE and DOUBTFUL are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant; that is, these bank characteristics are
not important in determining the interest rate on loans. This
result contradicts the certiﬁcation motive and the market
discipline hypothesis.
On the contrary, bank size presents signiﬁcant and pos-
itive coeﬃcients, suggesting that larger banks charge higher
interest rates on loans, arguably, borrowers prefer large
banks, and they are willing to pay higher rates to these
banks. Similarly, the coeﬃcients of LIQUIDITY are positive
and signiﬁcant. Therefore, bank size and liquidity may be
approaching the certiﬁcation and reﬁnancing motives.
ROA and ROE are not statistically signiﬁcant, and some
coeﬃcients related to time dummies are negative and sig-
niﬁcant, as we can expect, because of the general negative
trend of the interest rate on loans during the period of anal-
ysis (see Figure 1).
It is possible to recognize other reasons for higher in-
terest rates on loans. It could be that risky borrowers, willing
to pay higher interest rates, systematically prefer high-
quality banks. However, note that our panel data, through
time series, account for this possibility. Furthermore, prob-
ably solvent banks operate in areas with less competition,
working on sophisticated and speciﬁc ﬁnancial services,
lending more in domestic currency than in foreign curren-
cy, and so on. In other words, the interest rate on loansmight
be determined by the supply side, by the bank’s internal
capital supply. We are controlling for this possibility using
the time dummy variables, because we do not have enough
data to try to estimate both the demand and supply curves;
therefore, we used the reduced form equation proposed by
Park (1995).
As additional robustness checks, we also estimated the
four basic speciﬁcations using the DIF GMM estimator (see
Table 4, columns 5–8). These regressions also pass the cor-
relation tests and the Sargan test. In general, we can say that
the ﬁndings remain qualitatively the same with respect to
the effects of capital ratio on interest rate on loans. Note that
only in two of the four regressions CAPITALR has positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, in favor of the working hypoth-
esis. In the other two regressions, its coeﬃcients are not
statistically signiﬁcant, but there is no evidence against the
working hypothesis. Similarly, the ﬁndings in the DIF GMM
regressions support the effects of LIQUIDITY; subsequently,
banks with higher liquidity charge higher interest rates.
It is interesting to note that under the DIF GMMmodel,
the indicators of asset quality (RESERVE and DOUBTFUL)
present signiﬁcant coeﬃcients with the expected sign, in
favor of the certiﬁcation motive, and ROA and ROE are pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that banks with
higher proﬁtability charge higher interest rates on loans.
Nevertheless, these results are not robust, although they are
good news for future studies.
In the DIF GMM regressions, bank size present some neg-
ative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, contradicting the effects
of bank size in the SYS GMM regressions. Therefore, the effect
of bank size is uncertain.
To sum up, our ﬁndings imply a positive evidence of
market discipline from the asset side, principally in favor
of the reﬁnancing motive, where banks with higher capital
ratios and higher levels of liquidity charge higher interest
rates on loans. In other words, borrowers are willing to pay
higher interest rates to banks with high levels in these bank
fundamentals, which indicate the banks’ ability to provide
credits in the future.
4. Conclusions
Market discipline plays an important role for reliability
of banking systems. The new Basel Accord, theoretical frame-
works, and empirical evidence supporting the existence of
market discipline (from the liability and asset sides) provide
the basis for testingmarket discipline in the Kyrgyz Republic.
In this paper, we veriﬁed whether borrowers pay higher
interest rates to high-quality Kyrgyz banks, as the market
discipline hypothesis from the asset side predicts. Similar
tests were developed in Norway, Mexico, and Russia where,
in general, the ﬁndings suggest that banks confront market
discipline induced by borrowers (Kim et al., 2005;
Tovar-García, 2012, 2013).
In Kyrgystan, our empirical ﬁndings suggest that higher
levels of capital to asset ratios and liquidity are positively
linked to higher interest rates on loans, as the reﬁnancing
motive predicts. In other words, borrowers are willing to
pay higher interest rates to solvent banks to facilitate future
credit lines and new loans. In that way, borrowers disci-
pline bank risk-taking.
The theory also highlights a certiﬁcation motive, where
borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to banks
with high levels of asset quality (quality of bank loans). In
Kyrgystan, our ﬁndings on this respect are not robust. Our
indicators, reserves for loan losses/nonperforming loans and
doubtful loans/total loans, show the expected effects in DIF
GMM regressions, but this result is not supported by the
SYS GMM regressions (our baseline model). Similarly, we
did not ﬁnd robust effects of bank proﬁtability and bank size
on loan rate.
Our results only suggest that borrowers, to select a com-
mercial bank, are concerned about major sources of funds,
such as capital ratios and liquidity. This result is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and robust to different methods and control
variables. We can interpret this as evidence in favor of the
market discipline hypothesis induced by borrowers in the
Kyrgyz banking system.
Barth et al. (2013) show that Kyrgyzstan, in compari-
son with the rest of the world, has very low levels of
information disclosure requirements. In their index on the
private monitoring of banks (incentives and the ability of
private investors to monitor and exert effective gover-
nance over banks), Kyrgyzstan ranks fairly low. Nonetheless,
following the economic and political crisis, Kyrgyzstan in-
creased private monitoring and oﬃcial supervisory powers,
and tightened bank capital regulations.
In general, in Kyrgyzstan the implementation of the Basel
Accords is lacking and lagging, there are only draft regula-
tions, and they are not published. It is not clear if there are
plans to implement the Third Pillar (Financial Stability
Institute BIS, 2013). Bankers argue that a disclosure policy
is costly because the exposure of risk management strat-
egies will negatively affect bank proﬁtability, and can
generate banking panic. However, the Third Pillar (market
discipline) requires disclosure and transparency to be
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enhanced. This will lead to higher levels of capitalization
and the reduction of bank risk, with useful social
implications.
Subsequently, we found evidence to support the Third
Pillar of Basel III, and we can recommend to policymakers
to work according to the disclosure policy, because bor-
rowers also can use bank information to regulate the risky
behavior of their banks.
In other words, there is empirical evidence of market dis-
cipline, which can be reinforced by bank information
disclosures, strengthening bank transparency as proposed
by Basel II in 2004 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2006), and reaﬃrmed in 2010 in Basel III, which also pro-
posed the detailed disclosure of the capital base (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011, 2013). This will
complement supervision activities, because bank credi-
tors and debtors monitor and inﬂuence bank risk-taking,
allowing supervisors to react to market signals, as well as
regular practices.
This work presents important empirical ﬁndings, which
should encourage policymakers to continue working on
market discipline in Kyrgyzstan, and suggesting that other
post-Soviet countries of Central Asia should explore the
market discipline hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to recognize data limitations, our period of analysis
covers only a few years, and we mainly used accounting in-
formation. Future research for Kyrgyzstan should develop
surveys, and empirical tests, directly employing relevant in-
formation from banking agreements.
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